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REGULATING CREDIT: TACKLING THE REDISTRIBUTIVENESS OF 
NEOLIBERALISM 
DEBORAH JAMES 
 
South Africa found itself on the front pages of the world’s press in 2012 when police shot and 
killed 34 miners during a strike by rock-drillers at the Marikana platinum mine. Horror was 
expressed at the authorities’ use of lethal force and at how this echoed earlier killings in the 
apartheid era – most notably those at Sharpeville. But underpinning the episode was an 
opposition rather different from the earlier one, in which the politically disenfranchised were 
faced down by officers of an authoritarian state. Attempting to identify the character of this 
opposition, the initial condemnation was followed by a spate of analyses. Among these was 
the revelation by several newspaper reports that the miners, not necessarily in the lowest 
pay bracket, had unsustainable levels of debt. An additional feature making this doubly 
burdensome, indeed intolerable, was the manner in which their numerous creditors were 
ensuring repayments. In what has become a characteristically South African phenomenon, 
miner’s pay, automatically transferred into their bank accounts at month end, was being 
transferred out of these again with equal ease by those to whom they owed money. Shortly 
after payday, many of them simply had nothing left to live on. The Marikana killings, then, 
were at least partly about economic rather than political disenfranchisement. 
 
Affecting many others in South African society, and over a much longer timespan than this 
particular episode suggests, the problem of indebtedness has tended to be framed in terms 
that individualize, isolate and call people to account as ‘consumers’, rather than uniting and 
leading them to group action, labour organisation or solidarity as ‘citizens’. This suggests 
that there is something characteristically neoliberal about the phenomenon of indebtedness 
as manifest here and now. But, as the eventual worker activism demonstrates, it ended up 
translating into terms that were solidaristic, confrontational, and ultimately political. There 
were in fact strongly political aspects about the way the ‘debt problem’ was framed from the 
start: albeit one embedded in a sphere in which the market had begun to hold sway. 
 
The poorly or under-trained police officers were criticized for having shot to kill, and their 
superiors lambasted for failing to teach their underlings more appropriate forms of crowd 
control. One line of argument might have it however that, by using lethal force, they 
unashamedly embodied the violence of the state: that agency which, says Graeber, backs 
up the financial system and underpins the distorted arrangements that have turned debt, 
originally a matter of Maussian reciprocity, into one of unequal power and of enduring 
hierarchy in the modern world (2011). Other authors, taking a less ambitious and somewhat 
more culturally relativist perspective, have made arguments that are nonetheless equally 
telling. They talk about the mismatch between how creditors (with the backing of states and 
global finance) and powerless debtors (often but not only rural dwellers in poor countries) 
are evaluated in seemingly ‘moral’ terms (Shipton 2011:232-3). 
 
But trenchant criticisms of creditors and financialised lending have not been lacking among 
those who hold office in South Africa’s ANC government. The Minister of Trade and Industry, 
Rob Davies, spoke at a press briefing soon after the shooting, about credit providers’ 
‘outright preying on the vulnerabilities of low income and working people’, and undertook to 
implement more controls in order to check such activities. Such a statement might sound 
opportunist: as though too little – in response to general outrage – was being done too late. 
On the contrary. Given that a need to review ‘consumer credit legislation has long been 
recognized’, as policy documents revealed (DTI 2002, 2004), stringent efforts have been 
made since South Africa’s democratic transition to regulate and control the lending of money 
at interest. These efforts resulted, in 2007, in the passing of an ambitious new piece of 
legislation: the National Credit Act, which set out far-reaching reforms and established the 
National Credit Register as part of its remit. 
 
One illustration of the deeply ‘political’ character of the credit problem and its proposed 
solution was the fact that numerous groups of actors from across the board had been 
consulted in successive draftings of the Bill that eventually passed into law. Broadly 
speaking, those consulted divided into lenders and borrowers respectively; corresponding 
more or less with the classic Marxist division between the sphere of capital on the one hand 
and labour on the other. Perhaps not quite as clearly aligned, but tending overall to 
represent borrowers (and labour) more than the reverse, there was input from an important 
civil society/human rights organisation, the Black Sash. 
 
This then is part of the longer history – showing that the relation between debtors and 
creditors concerns ‘politics’ and not simply ‘the market’ – behind the Marikana massacre. But 
there is a further dimension as well: one which highlights the caution that is necessary 
before simply shoving South Africa (and perhaps any country) into the category of a 
‘neoliberal’ state or regime. To understand this point is also to grasp that the story of a 
struggle between capital and labour, while certainly true, needs some qualifying. South 
Africa’s economy came to be dominated, during the 20th century, by well-established 
sectors of Afrikaner capitalism (‘maize’) and English capitalism (‘gold’). Having participated 
differentially in the processes of proletarianisation that created a cheap black labour force, 
the two then had a decades-long struggle over which would have preferential access to that 
force. (Both are now being in part replaced by a more ethnically hybrid, if still mostly white 
dominated, capitalist sector of ‘finance’.) At the same time, a succession of governments 
with nationalist agendas, first Afrikaner (post 1948) and later black African (post 1994) have 
needed to keep themselves close to, and ensure the upliftment of, parts of the electorate not 
easily classified as either capital or labour. This has been ensured, in both cases albeit in 
different ways, by the clientelistic distribution of jobs: especially in the civil service (O Meara 
1983; Southall 2012) and in state-owned enterprise. Showing yet further ‘distributional’ or 
‘redistributive’ tendencies has been the widespread distribution of social grants (Seekings 
and Nattrass 2006; Bahre 2011). Finally, albeit smaller in scale, intermittent attempts have 
also been made, particularly during the 21st century, to accommodate the needs of that 
increasingly large section of the electorate bent on making its own living in the cracks and 
interstices of the system. Now that the era of state capitalism has passed and that of 
liberalisation has arrived, these operators are framed, and encouraged, as ‘small to medium-
sized entrepreneurs’. But their activities, law abiding and otherwise, have long been tacitly 
tolerated in a ‘dual economy’ where brokers and commission-based agents mediate mostly 
white-dominated capitalist enterprise and the largely black world of workers, the unemployed 
and the poor. These latter are also the major consumers and – increasingly – users of credit. 
 
The wellsprings of credit reform 
 
In the small Knysna office of the Black Sash, South Africa’s premier human rights 
organisation which offers paralegal advice, I talk to Xolela May, a well-known consumer 
rights activist and lawyer. He is one of a small network of people spread across South Africa 
whose strong sense of indignation about the credit conundrum, and whose commitment to 
the cause of the indebted, have driven him to play a key role in designing and implementing 
arrangements to help alleviate their plight, and to regulate the activities of lenders. These 
measures were aimed, in particular, at tackling the often unscrupulous and frankly illegal 
procedures used by creditors to get their hands into debtors’ bank accounts. 
 
He recalls the origins of his activism. Having grown up in the black township of Langa, Cape 
Town, he says it was a daily occurrence for neighbours, having got themselves into debt, to 
have property repossessed by creditors. He would observe the sheriff of the court arriving 
and doing an inventory of the neighbour’s possessions prior to confiscating these, while the 
neighbour stood by helplessly. Although Cape Town was host to several law clinics and 
human rights law organizations, Langa residents had no idea how to contact any of these: 
their plight was an ‘issue of powerlessness’. 
 
He later rose above his humble origins to study law, worked for a while at an NGO called 
Legalwise, and eventually joined the Black Sash. At the time, he tells me, a still wider variety 
of providers were feverishly extending credit to people formerly denied it. Debtors were 
being taken to court in record numbers. Property was also being seized and auctioned to a 
greater extent than Xolela had seen in his youth. But he had also noted a newer 
phenomenon. Instead of merely having their furniture reclaimed, defaulters were signing 
agreements, as instructed by the clerk of the magistrates’ courts, to have parts of their 
wages deducted by their employers and paid over to their creditors. (These were the 
‘emoluments attachment’ or ‘garnishee’ orders, much feared by their recipients and soon to 
become infamous, of which more will be said below.) In the process, he noticed how legal 
practitioners acting on behalf of creditors – ‘likely to go to the last stage, so they can have 
profit’ – were routinely ignoring particular sections of the relevant legislation, the Magistrates 
Court Act of 1944, passed four years before the apartheid regime officially began, which 
might have afforded some protection to debtors. 
 
On the basis of his experiences with indebted people in Knysna, Xolela applied in 2001 to 
the Department of Justice to house a help desk in their offices, on behalf of the Black Sash. 
The matter with which he concerned himself most thoroughly was a particular section – 
Section 65 – of the Magistrates Court Act. 
 
It makes a provision that before any court order can be made in respect of the 
financial attachment of the emoluments – which is the wages of the debtor – the 
court has to make it a point that that debtor has remained with sufficient means in 
order to maintain himself and the family. 
 
This section of the existing legislation provided debtors with greater rights than were 
normally recognized, and Xolela’s crusade was to advise them of these rights. Given their 
unfamiliarity with court proceedings, they were being intimidated into agreeing to 
unsustainable debt repayments. It was this same problem that newspapers reported as 
having afflicted the miners at Marikana: having become indebted and voluntarily submitted 
themselves to astronomical levels of repayment, they had nothing left to live on. 
 
Engaging with these issues while also negotiating with the lawyers concerned, Xolela was 
able to build ‘good networking relationships, which we still have with our local attorneys’, on 
the basis of which he and other Black Sash officers started advising these attorneys against 
the unsustainable pursuit of debtors unable to fulfil their obligations: 
 
this person is unemployed therefore there is no way you can proceed with the matter. 
You can suspend any legal action on this matter, because, if you continue, what will 
be the point of you proceeding with the action while you know at the end of the day 
you are not going to recover anything? It’s a waste of your resources. 
 
While Xolela was still operating the Black Sash help desk at the Department of Justice, he 
was also playing an important role in the consultations that were under way to draft, conduct 
consultations on, and eventually pass, the key piece of legislation that was intended to 
remedy many of these ills: the National Credit Act of 2007, with its system of ‘debt review’ 
and ‘debt counselling’. 
 
He gives me a frank account of both the advantages of the Act and its unexpected – and 
often undesirable – outcomes. With great canniness, many lawyers, less able after the 
passing of the Act than previously to earn money from pursuing penniless debtors on behalf 
of creditors, ‘have changed their hats to own … debt counselling agencies’. Others doing a 
similar switch of role are those, previously acting as ‘debt collectors’ or ‘debt administrators’ 
(as stipulated by the Magistrates Court Act), who now practise as ‘debt counsellors’ (as 
stipulated by its intended replacement, the National Credit Act). Underlying this opportunistic 
change of ‘hats’ is the existence of ‘unscrupulous individuals who wanted to benefit’ by 
exploiting the desperation of poor people. Spotting the imminent end of the old and the onset 
of the new, they have joined the rush to take advantage of a new business opportunity. 
 
My encounter with Xolela gives me an insight into the dogged and dedicated reforming zeal 
which motivates a number of activists: those who might, in a previous era, have concerned 
themselves with what appear to be more fundamental human rights abuses but in the 
current one have homed in on consumer rights – and in particular the rights of those in debt 
– as a key issue of concern. It illuminates the character of the legal arrangements that 
previously prevailed. Showing which aspects of these were deemed to require reform or 
abolition, it also elucidates the personalized, entrepreneurial, episodic, and often piecemeal 
character of the steps taken to put the new arrangements in place. These often generated 
unintended consequences, producing new problems that in turn required fresh legislative 
arrangements to remedy. Reforms were always thus – but there is something about the 
character of the state and the law in South Africa that marks them off as particular. There is 
great readiness to produce innovative policies in the name of social justice and equality, 
often on the basis of lessons learnt from elsewhere. But entrenched interests, not only those 
of big business but also of a number of smaller intermediaries and self-styled entrepreneurs 
with few other ways to make a living, often find ways to dress up in new clothes, dodging the 
potential restrictions that reforming initiatives aim to put in place and taking advantage of 
these to create new opportunities. 
 
Runaway liberalization and belated regulation 
 
The process through which lenders, although having for half a century had recourse to 
recoup their money from borrowers’ bank accounts, suddenly started doing so in earnest, is 
a key part of this story. It is the South African version of a broader global trend, in which, ‘as 
lenders re-toughen their terms in an effort to cover their costs while reaching smaller-scale, 
poorer borrowers, older and more familiar issues about where usury begins also resurface’ 
(Shipton 2011:231). Ostensibly ‘to open up the market for small borrowers’, previously 
excluded from opportunities to start small enterprises because of their inability to borrow 
money from the big banks, existing legislation restricting the interest rate was removed in 
1992. Removing the restriction would enable lenders – in theory equally small – to run viable 
businesses catering to the needs of such borrowers, thus creating opportunities for both. 
The then Minister of Trade and Industry ‘signed into law an exemption to the Usury Act’ of 
1968, ‘which removed price control on small loans’ of under R6000 and with a duration of 
less than 36 months (Porteous with Hazelhurst 2004:77, 83). Putting a ceiling on the interest 
rate, as the Usury Act had previously done, was allegedly making it impossible for legitimate 
micro-lenders to collect their debts and cover their expenses by imposing a ‘full cost 
recovery interest rate’. The rationale was that such small lenders, some of whom had 
already started emerging in the 1980s, unable to stay in business with a restricted interest 
rate, would then close up shop or go underground and turn into ‘loansharks’ offering more 
expensive credit. It would be to the unsavoury practices of these illegal lenders that the poor 
would then be exposed and vulnerable (Daniels 2004:846-7). 
 
Out of this action arose one of the ‘most dramatic developments in the landscape of access 
over the past decade’ (Porteous with Hazelhurst 2004:77). Instead of borrowing to set up 
businesses, the previously deprived population started taking out loans aimed at helping 
them engage in consumption.  According to Mark Seymour, a spokesman for the micro-
finance industry, ‘a host of lower-income individuals in South Africa who couldn’t access 
formal credit from the banks’ were now able to borrow from a sector ‘that could price for the 
perceived risk of granting credit to these people’. 
 
The opportunities were not limitless, nor were the intended ‘smaller’ lenders the principle 
survivors: this initial period of ‘breakout’ was followed by one of ‘consolidation’ when several 
of the retail banks opened up micro-lending arms, other small operators merged to become 
big ones, and several lenders went out of business (Porteous with Hazelhurst 2004:79). But 
there was a general sense that a feeding frenzy was under way. An anecdotal account from 
someone who observed this process at the time describes the situation in terms that are 
vivid if not entirely complimentary: 
 
A large number of unscrupulous lenders piled into the market. Later, an outfit called 
ABIL (African Bank Investments Limited) bought out these and other small 
microlenders. There was a case of someone who borrowed R20 000 from his father 
and started extending loans at a bus depot. He lost the first R20,000, then told his 
father he had figured out how to do it properly and borrowed a further advance. 
Within a short time he had made enough money to buy a house in Johannesburg’s 
up-market suburb of Sandton, for cash. (Fieldnotes 27th July 2008). 
 
David Porteous, who at the time was in charge of the DfID-funded Finmark Trust with its 
intended aim to ‘democratise finance’, puts his finger on a key feature of this new credit 
landscape. Although it might on the face of it sound unstable, even ‘bubble’-like, lenders 
were not in fact unduly exposed to the risk of non-repayment (Porteous with Hazelhurst 
2004:77). This is because they were able, with state sanction, to collect debts through the 
payroll (especially, in the case of civil servants, via the ‘Persal’ system), or from borrowers’ 
banks by taking their ATM cards and using their PINs: a practice widespread at the time and 
only later outlawed. 
 
The ‘recklessness’ of this newly burgeoning credit industry was much criticized. The results 
were certainly negative for the many consumers who had started responding to offers of 
cheap credit. They were borrowing not only or even principally from ‘micro-lenders’ but also 
from clothing and up-market grocery stores and car dealers, while still continuing the earlier-
established practice of buying on hire purchase from furniture retailers. If we match this 
narrative with Xolela May’s account, it becomes clear that many of those ‘debtors unable to 
fulfil their obligations’ for which he set up his help line came from exactly this group of newly-
enabled borrowers. The overall result is generally agreed to have been detrimental to the 
financial ‘wellness’ of many (Cash 1996, cited in Bahri 2008; Crous 2008). This glib-
sounding phrase conceals some very serious effects: a deep sense of helplessness, and 
social ills such as suicide, divorces and homelessness. 
 
There is an ethnic/racial dimension to the tale. If anxiety about problem borrowing was 
focused on the newly enfranchised members of South Africa’s public service, the attempted 
regulation of supply focused in particular on a group whose establishment of small-scale 
lending enterprises had been a response to its own recent disenfranchisement – that is, 
members of the white Afrikaans-speaking minority, mostly supporters of the apartheid 
government, who had been rewarded with civil service jobs in an earlier period. Being 
offered retrenchment packages to leave the civil service, many invested these in establishing 
micro-lending businesses. It was to curb the excesses of these newly-established 
entrepreneurs – to which the removal of the exemption clause in the Usury Act had initially 
given rise – that the Act was later formulated. To state matters simply: the public service had 
been newly restaffed by black Africans, leaving many of its former white/Afrikaner 
employees to seek alternative ways of making a living. Many of them did so by moving into 
the microfinance industry (James 2012; Krige 2012). State moneys were flowing into the 
bank accounts of black civil servants, from which the new entrepreneurs were making efforts 
to divert them. 
 
These runaway developments and their unintended consequences led, in turn, to the state’s 
clamping down in 1999. A notice revising the initial exemption to the Usury Act was 
promulgated. It outlawed the deduction of employees’ wages directly from the payroll (thus 
leading to the collapse of a building society, Saambou, whose extensive micro-lending arm 
had relied on precisely this process, and to the near-collapse of another large bank), and 
outlawed the use of Chip and PIN to recoup loans from borrowers. It also established the 
MicroFinance Regulatory Council (MFRC) and initiated the process which eventually led to 
the passing of the National Credit Act, effective as from June 2007, which capped the 
interest rate for unsecured loans at 31% as part of its aim of curbing ‘reckless lending’: a 
phrase used to characterize all creditors but initially aimed in particular at the behaviour of 
this new microlending industry. 
 
Debating the Bill 
 
During debates on draft versions of the Bill, key arenas of policy debate and argumentation 
came to the fore. Allegedly governed by the impersonal character of the ‘free market’, topics 
like the ‘interest rate’, ‘credit scoring’ and the like became fulcra on which fierce moral 
contestations turned (see Shipton 2011:226; 232). While financiers and business 
representatives asserted ‘the self-evident’ truth, in the interests of sustainability and 
economic growth, that ‘all loans and repayments should cancel each other out’ (Shipton 
2011:217), consumer rights groups, trades unions and those claiming to represent the 
interests of the workers (alongside the poor and unemployed), challenged this, demanded 
protection from usurious practices, and even requested debt amnesties. 
 
Blurring the boundaries between these two opposing sides, those speaking on behalf of 
business frequently framed their arguments so as to make them sound more concerned with 
the interests of workers and the impoverished than with their own. Nowhere was this more 
evident than in ongoing disputes about whether the capping of the interest rate would be to 
the benefit (by reducing ‘recklessness’) – or conversely disadvantage (by distorting the ‘free 
market’) – the interests of consumers. This came to the fore in discussions about the bill’s 
provision for ‘emergency loan provision’, which would allow a person with a high debt level, 
faced with an unanticipated life event, to take out a further loan. Business representatives 
argued strenuously that allowing such extra loans ought not to be counted as ‘reckless’. In 
order to allow such loans, the interest rate, in their view a neutral, quasi-scientific instrument 
which enables the competition of the market to provide for self-regulation, ought to be 
‘uncapped’ once again, and to remain unregulated. Failure to do so, far from protecting 
borrowers, would ‘distort supply’ and (re)create the very same ‘dual credit economy’ which it 
was imperative to eradicate, said Johan de Ridder of African Bank Investments Limited. In 
similar vein, the clothing retailers’ submission maintained that the ‘capping’ of the rate to 
which their sector is currently subject ‘restricts’ their ‘ability to take on more risk by offsetting 
the additional losses with the improved interest income’. They asked to be allowed to charge 
rates similar to those of UK stores like Harrods, where the interest rate is ‘28.9% pa’, on the 
grounds that 
 
A customer who was not happy with the interest rate from one provider could obtain 
funding from another provider to settle the debt with the original provider and in so 
doing reduce the cost of credit to the consumer. This approach will stimulate 
competition in the market place and will reduce the cost of credit to the consumer. 
 
Supporting stringent regulations and the capping of the interest rate, the trade union 
COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions) aimed to protect its wage-earning 
worker members from the rapaciousness of unscrupulous lenders. Where industry 
submissions use the shadowy figure of the loanshark (mashonisa) as their ultimate weapon, 
threatening that capping of the interest rate will once again drive borrowers underground and 
put them at the mercy of this demonic figure, the COSATU submission counters that it is 
precisely the lack of regulation which is likely to cause microlenders to engage in exploitative 
lending practices. They warn of the danger that ‘these registered microlenders and other 
credit grantors’ might ‘capture the market of unregistered microlenders; that is, they will start 
to charge ‘ “mashonisa rates”, increase their interest rate on loans, and further exploit the 
vulnerable and poor, but legally so!’ (White) microlenders – with their ‘captive audience and 
no competition’, pricing interest rates ‘to what the market will bear’, and practising ‘poor 
disclosure to a vulnerable consumer segment’ – are the villains in their account; the (black) 
moneylender or mashonisa, both informal and technically illegal, appears as a more 
community-minded figure (see Krige 2011; James 2012). 
 
Contestation, implicitly moral in tone, was also fierce over ‘credit worthiness’. Members of 
South Africa’s governing tripartite alliance (ANC, SACP and COSATU) had long held that 
those with existing debts had the right to have these expunged, thus allowing them a fresh 
start concurrent with the Act’s coming into law, with COSATU demanding ‘access for all, to 
financial services, including an amnesty for those listed by credit bureaux’. Citing the 
undesirability and destabilizing effect on the financial sector of having ‘millions of citizens 
excluded from access to credit, many for trivial amounts and because of exploitative interest 
rates, lack of affordable credit, discrimination or joblessness’, the union stated that ‘apartheid 
credit practices and massive exploitation of the poor did not end with the fall of the apartheid 
regime – they flourished after 1994 and so did credit blacklistings’. Since rich people 
formerly transferring assets offshore had recently been offered an amnesty allowing them to 
repatriate these, COSATU maintained it would be fair to offer an equivalent amnesty to the 
‘two million blacklisted adults’ – many of them COSATU members – whose status was 
creating a ‘serious national problem’. Protesting against the fact that credit bureaux were 
‘selling information to agencies to screen potential employees’, the union maintained that 
this was unacceptable and unconstitutional, since it threatened to increase unemployment 
and to relegate ‘jobseekers to further economic hardship’. They thus demanded that credit 
information be sold only for the purposes of assessing creditworthiness and that sale or use 
of credit information for other purposes should be an offence. 
 
Submissions on this topic by the business community, including the Credit Bureau 
Association, had a predictably different thrust. They maintained that the bill was already 
biased in favour of debtors and against the interests of creditors. Arguing that credit is not a 
‘right’ but a ‘market instrument, access to which must be earned’, they point to how impairing 
the ‘free flow’ of credit information would be injurious, ultimately restricting credit itself. They 
objected in particular to the section of the bill which required that, once a clearance 
certificate had been issued recognizing a consumer’s having ‘satisfied all obligations’, the 
‘credit bureau must expunge from its records … the fact that consumer was subject to debt 
re-arrangement’. This, they claimed, would have the unintended consequence of removing 
 
risk predictive behaviour data … there will be no way for a credit provider to establish 
if a consumer has a pattern of non payment and of having his/her debts restructured. 
Lender confidence in the information held by credit bureaux will be low, resulting in 
lenders devising other means of protecting themselves against the risk of bad debt. 
 
This was disingenuous, however. During the credit feeding frenzy of the 1990s, lenders had 
already ‘devised other means’ of protecting themselves against such risks: that of gaining 
direct access to borrowers’ bank accounts in one way or another. 
 
A further area of disagreement concerned the ambiguous aims of the Act: it was intended 
not only to protect vulnerable and financially uninformed borrowers from ‘reckless’ lenders, 
but also, in the new spirit of affirmative action or ‘Black Economic Empowerment’, to open up 
new possibilities for black business in fields which had previously been dominated by whites 
or members of ethnic minorities from South Asia or elsewhere. Such opportunities included 
those of debt counselling itself. (Less intentionally and often unscrupulously, they would also 
turn out to include microlending, and also to the dodgy debt administration that Xolela had 
described).  But such opportunities would themselves require regulation and consumer 
protection. One of these, already long existing as a livelihood strategy in the black 
community, was ‘direct selling’ on credit (and on commission) by salesmen visiting 
employees’ places of work. A submission to the Bill vigorously defended the rights of such 
sales agents, pointing out that the reason why they visit the ‘work places of potential 
consumers to enter into loan agreements’ is largely because such ‘consumers are not able 
during office hours to attend at the credit provider’s physical premises’, and that worldwide 
trends in direct selling indicate that ‘it is certainly convenient, speedy and efficient both for 
the credit provider and the consumer for the loan agreement at times, to be concluded at the 
consumer’s work premises’. Prohibiting such a practice, the submission anticipates, will 
result in the closure or complete (and costly) restructuring of ‘many small credit operator 
businesses relying solely on agents to sell their goods and/or products to employees at their 
work’. 
 
The thousands of agents currently operating within the South African framework 
would immediately lose their jobs resulting in catastrophic implications for their 
families and extended families. …by preventing business being done at work or at 
home a large section of the economy will effectively be destroyed overnight. 
 
These claims starkly illustrate the contradictory character of the legislation. For every piece 
of protection offered to borrowers, one of the semi-formal income-generating opportunities 
so characteristic of those ‘formerly marginalized’ might be forfeit. 
 
 
Overall, then, members of the business community were reiterating the familiar claim that 
only by securing market freedom can consumers best be served. The countervailing position 
was that consumers require protection, even – perhaps – from their own profligacy.  
Business interests prevailed when it came to the demand for a ‘credit amnesty’, but in other 
respects the Act as passed maintained the appearance of an uneasy truce. Unresolved 
issues, already partly addressed by ‘other means’, would need to be further addressed by 
these. 
 
New legislation, old scams 
 
In what appears as a classic opposition between market forces and state regulation, 
between capital and labour, some complicating factors belie the stridency of the claims 
made by both sides that were debating the National Credit Bill. The spectre of the ‘loanshark’ 
is condemned by business as the figure of illegality against whom all ought to be united, but 
defended by the unions as a communally embedded persona, striving to make a living, and 
even offering protection against the worst ravages of retail credit. More ambiguously, the 
community-based direct seller selling items on credit and earning a commission seems to 
epitomize the figure of the ‘small scale entrepreneur’ whose efforts the government has been 
keen to promote. Her lending is a by-product of the way she makes a living, which is barely 
sufficient to distinguish her clearly from those to whom she sells (and lends). 
 
What complicates matters still further is the behaviour of yet another set of actors that makes 
its living by enterprise, in a manner whose borderline legality – or fullblown abuse – seems 
easier to condemn, yet which might be regarded as equally and inextricably a part of the 
system, especially since they operated with impunity under the rubric of the previously-
existing laws. The existing legislative framework of the Magistrates Court Act was much 
more detailed and restrictive (albeit as Xolela told me poorly understood or executed) 
whereas the new legislation, in the modern legal spirit of mediation, was often imprecise 
about legal procedures. It was the fine-grained specifications of the earlier legal 
arrangements that opportunistic and canny operators had used for their own advantage. 
Legislating against these illegal and opportunistic practices – and not only against the 
‘reckless’ provision of ‘credit’ – had been one reason why the Act was drafted and 
implemented. But if the existing laws were barely enforced, what were the chances of the 
new Act’s being any better implemented? 
 
The protagonists of these practices ranged from lawyers who had been struck off but who 
were nonetheless operating as debt administrators, through unregistered ‘credit repair 
companies’ fraudulently offering to expunge the names and records of consumers from the 
credit bureaux but failing to do so, to mainstream retailers selling furniture or clothes on hire 
purchase, apparently legitimately but engaging in unsanctioned and illegal practices in order 
to collect outstanding repayments. After the passing of the Act, the establishment of debt 
counselling, one of the key remedies proposed, led in turn (according to the law of 
unintended consequences) to the establishment of rogue companies and/or individual 
operators that offered such services. As indicated by Xolela, it is in many cases the 
fraudulent ‘debt administrators’, operating in the loopholes offered by the previous set of 
laws, who have adjusted to the new regime by retooling themselves as ‘debt counsellors’. 
 
In essence, these illegal practices centre on the ‘other means’ identified above, which 
protect creditors from ‘the risk of non-repayment’ (Porteous with Hazelhurst 2004:77) by 
enabling them – and commission-based field agents, debt collectors, or intermediaries acting 
on their behalf – to reach into debtors’ bank accounts. One of these was the ‘emoluments 
attachment’ or ‘garnishee order’ by means of which outstanding debts were being collected 
directly from a debtor’s salary. Granted by a magistrate and served on the employer of the 
debtor by a sheriff, it requires that the employer enable a creditor, at a 5% charge to that 
creditor, to take a monthly repayment directly from the salary of the defaulting debtor who is 
in his employ. The debtor gives his signature on the ‘consent to judgement’, as proof that he 
has agreed to the arrangements. Describing the system as one with ‘terrible irregularities’, 
legal aid expert Frans Haupt assures me that ‘if you have a legally and financially illiterate 
consumer he will sign anything, especially if you harass him at work.’ 
 
The impact of such an order on employee wellbeing has caused great worry, not only to 
workers but also to employers. Making matters worse, when debts accumulate, with debtors 
borrowing from new sources to pay their original creditors, so too do the number of orders. 
Another member of Frans Haupt’s team, Anneke Smit, bears out Xolela’s earlier 
observations: ‘It is not long before another creditor follows the same route’, resulting in a 
situation where ‘a large part or even all of the consumer’s salary goes to the creditors, 
leaving the consumer with no or insufficient means to pay for his living expenses and 
support his family’ (Smit 2008:2). As orders proliferate, so too do the negative effects on the 
‘wellness’ of employees: including ‘absenteeism, stress-related illness, pilfering, theft, 
violence, family problems, reckless gambling, alcohol abuse, unfounded demands for pay 
increases, resignation from employment in order to obtain access to pensions’ (Haupt and 
Coetzee 2008:82) in order ‘to settle all their debt’ rather than retaining these for use in 
retirement (Smit 2008:2). Some employees, such as BMW (with funds from the German 
Development Funding Agency GTZ), had designed ‘employee financial wellness’ 
programmes as part of their packages of corporate social responsibility, commissioning 
Haupt to investigate the ‘undesirable processes’ being engaged in by creditors (ibid:83). 
These practices included the forging of signatures by debt collection agents who were paid 
on commission, the signing of documents by witnesses but not by the debtor, and the 
deliberate use by debt collectors of courts that were inconveniently situated, thus making it 
impossible to have the order rescinded without incurring huge travel costs and/or legal fees. 
Although the area of jurisdiction is clearly spelled out in the Act – ‘it is where the employer 
conducts his business or resides, the idea being that the employer can assist his employee 
going to that court to have this emoluments attachment order amended or set aside’, the 
debt collectors exploit the ‘lack of knowledge among the clerks of court’ of this fact. Even 
when granted legitimately, the use of such orders by queues of creditors, together with other 
kinds of debit orders placed on wage-earners’ incomes, has been much decried as 
contributing to the general unsustainability of life among indebted people in South Africa.  
Daphney Smith, an NGO community education officer, tells me that many people have been 
driven simply to abandon their bank accounts and to open new ones: a practice that had 
become endemic and was often repeated as creditors continued to pursue them from one 
account to the next. 
 
Also enabling ready access to debtors’ bank accounts was the system of ‘debt 
administration’, in theory supplanted by but often in fact co-existing with that proposed by the 
National Credit Act once it was passed. Introduced into South Africa’s Magistrate’s Court Act 
on the basis of a precedent from the UK, and applicable in the case of debts of less than 
R50,000, its original intention was to provide a system less drastic than bankruptcy or 
sequestration by granting the debtor ‘a statutory rescheduling of his debts’, stopping 
harassment by creditors and allowing debtors some breathing space in which to make 
payments while also making it impossible for them to get further into debt (Smit 2008:2, 5-6). 
The problems which administration was designed to remedy arose, in the first place, from 
the readiness with which creditors could request consents to judgement and procure 
emoluments attachment orders allowing access to the debtor’s salary or wage stream. Yet 
the remedy simply consisted of more of the same, resulting in debtors’ going further into 
debt. Administrators, once appointed, would be paid by means of yet another such order, 
diverting funds into a trust account for the purposes of ‘distribution’. From this account the 
administrator would, in theory, pay the various creditors. But administration orders, 
themselves, had grown ‘into an industry’ (Smit 2008:1-2), whose rewards arose largely from 
malpractice and inadequate policing of the law. Administrators, unqualified and unregistered, 
often overcharged their clients, or failed to pay creditors as they had undertaken to do, with 
outstanding interest from the unpaid debts then accumulating to the detriment of the debtor. 
In one case, administrators extended a loan to one of their clients, added themselves as a 
creditor and ‘distributed the better part of the client’s installment to themselves and the 
remainder to the client’s other creditors’. In others ‘administrators were attorneys who were 
struck off the roll or were themselves under administration.’ (Smit 2008:14). 
 
Illustrating the prevalence of small incremental payments creamed off by intermediaries, and 
further depleting debtors’ pay packets, commissions were awarded to the administrators for 
each payment. The charging of fees was not in itself illegal, but in practice there was 
‘fundamental distortion’ of the legal framework as originally intended. Despite the court’s 
having ruled in 2005 that only one ‘collection fee’ of a restricted size was legitimate, fees in 
fact far exceeded these, and administrators added to these the fees they were able to glean 
when granted (yet another) emoluments attachment order on the salary of the debtor for the 
purposes of transferring money into the ‘distribution’ account. This, in turn, would be paid to 
the creditors in question. In sum, 
 
since judgment debt may also be included under administration orders, an 
administrator will in many instances pay the creditor’s attorneys who will collect 10% 
of the installment before the money is paid over to the creditor. By now the employer 
took 5%, the administrator 12.5% and the attorneys acting on behalf of the creditor 
10% (plus VAT if registered for same). At this rate it is not surprising that 
administration orders cause debtors to go further into debt (Smit 2008:11). 
 
It was precisely these circumstances that had led to Xolela May’s concern, echoed in the 
Black Sash submission, that consumers ought not have to make repayments that leave them 
with an income below the minimum subsistence level. 
 
Undaunted by the array of problems, the architects of the reforms pressed bravely on. Under 
the leadership of Gabriel Davel, an accountant with a background in development finance 
who was appointed ‘micro-lending regulator’ and later became the CEO of the National 
Credit Register, a new set of procedures was pioneered. Key among these was the process 
of debt review as put into place by debt counsellors. Intended to fulfill the Act’s aims – ‘to 
provide for debt-reorganisation in cases of over-indebtedness’ – it would bypass the 
crookery and sharp practice of debt administration, while promoting ‘a consistent 
enforcement framework relating to consumer credit’. It would also bring to book those credit 
providers that had lent ‘recklessly’ and that, in competition with rival creditors, had been 
queuing up to place garnishee orders on debtors’ accounts – or had employed debt 
collectors, field agents and administrators to so this. 
 
Warnings had been issued, however, against expecting miracles to result from ‘wonderful 
legislation’. The Black Sash pointed out that the ‘promising aims’ of such reforms are 
frequently not realized due to the cost of implementing them; the Furniture Traders’ 
Association worried about the ‘administrative burden’ which the new laws would impose, and 
a legal practitioner maintained that it would be sufficient to amend, educate the unskilled 
clerks of the court responsible for, or properly police, the existing framework of the 
Magistrates Court Act rather than inventing a new one. Perhaps insufficiently noted was the 
more fundamental question of how to reform a system of ‘external judicial control’ (Haupt et 
al 2008:51) over debtors’ finances and salaries/wages, to yield one in which individuals, with 
the help of appropriate advice and guidance, eventually took control over these themselves, 
in the way normally expected of a modern ‘responsibilized’ citizen (Chipkin 2003). Davel’s 
perhaps idealistic philosophy was that ‘regulation works best when it persuades players in 
the industry to accept responsibility for their own decisions’ (Porteous with Hazelhurst 
2004:94), and much effort was subsequently expended by state and non-state actors in 
implementing systems of financial education and ‘wellness’ in order to persuade borrowers 
to take such responsibility. Making lenders accept it might require more stringent means. It 
was hoped, for example, that credit agreements found to have been ‘reckless’ from the 
outset might be suspended and made unenforceable by the courts, thus freeing debtors from 
eternal bondage, but existing inequalities between borrowers and lenders – not least in 
access to good legal advice – made this extremely difficult. The Act, albeit informed by a 
conviction that might be summarized thus – ‘lenders, like borrowers, should earn their trust’ 
(Shipton 2011:232) – would not on its own be equipped to make them do so. 
 
Debt counselling – a brave new world 
 
Discussions with debt counsellors, although giving me some insights into just how idealistic 
the expectations were of this ‘wonderful legislation’, also reveal that the cards were not 
automatically stacked to privilege either borrowers or lenders. Some cases demonstrate a 
touching and earnest desire by the debtor to fulfill the terms and stick by both the letter and 
the principle of the law, but show that the process of getting numerous creditors to agree on 
an acceptable payment schedule by which a debtor might also abide would prove difficult 
and time-consuming. Others manifest extreme levels of recalcitrance on the part of both 
creditors and debtors. In sum, the submissions cited earlier, with their claims either that the 
legislation would end up serving the interests of the market, or (contrarily, and more 
predominantly) that it was ‘weighed towards the interests of credit users with limited regard 
to the interests of credit providers’, must be read with circumspection. The complex 
processes were not skewed in either direction: what they achieved, instead, was a 
stalemate. The ‘credit users’ they ended up serving, however, were not predominantly those 
– low earners, workers, and the self- or unemployed – originally intended as the primary 
beneficiaries of the Act. 
 
When I visit Thusong Debt Counsellors, run by Sisinyana Pholo and Richard Mutshekwane 
at their modest offices in Midrand, they fill me in on the processes involved. The counsellor 
is required to go through clients’ basic needs to identify that all-important amount required, in 
Xolela’s words, ‘to maintain himself and the family’, setting this aside before deciding on a 
realistic set of repayments to be offered to credit providers. The providers are required to 
respond within 5 days. Often, they send a ‘counterproposal’. The debtor, once officially 
under debt review, must be allowed 60 days’ grace from harassment by those providers 
before the final schedule of payments is agreed and put into practice. 
 
I discover from them and other informants that national coverage of debt counselling is 
patchy, and often worst in rural areas. Debt counselling was initially thought of as most 
appropriately provided by the non-government, charity or donor-aided paralegal sectors: by 
offices such as the Knysna Black Sash where Xolela May works. This idea was later 
jettisoned, partly on the grounds of inadequate capacity – ‘Law Clinics and NGOs simply 
would not be able to manage’, Frans Haupt tells me – but also on the grounds that it is an 
activity from which a living might be made rather than one offered by charities. This was one 
topic on which submissions by ANC MPs and party members were voluble: in a setting of 
unemployment, debt counselling ought to provide income-generating opportunities. The 
requirement that debt counsellors have at least two years’ experience – in legal or paralegal 
services, consumer protection, complaints resolution, consumer advisory service, or 
accounting or financial services – would exclude too many, as one ANC member said in his 
submission on the Bill. The restrictions were lifted, eventually leaving only the paltry 
requirement that candidates undergo four days’ training and sit an examination on the fifth. 
As a result, Frans Haupt tells me, those targeting the higher-end market possibilities offered 
by this activity – the ‘richer indebted’ – have operated offices as ‘an add-on to an attorney 
practice, a financial advisor practice, a book-keeping practice: those people have a lot of 
background and experience. So for them a week-long course is fine … they have the 
capacity, they understand the system’. Those, on the other hand, who target the indebted 
with lower incomes or fewer resources, and/or who operate in more remote or marginal 
areas, are often poorly trained: 
 
we have had people taking consumers’ money as a deposit … and debiting it away 
as a fee, and without the job being done. Then we have complaints about people 
who had to wait a very long time, and in the meantime they are still being harassed 
by the credit provider, and they didn’t hear anything from the debt counsellor. The 
normal problem that you have when you start a practice is you take on too much 
because you want to make money, especially in the beginning when your overheads 
are high – investing in hardware and software, computers and stuff. So they tend to 
take on a lot of clients, and they can’t really service them properly. And then a few 
examples of proposals, and even court applications, that were simply not up to 
scratch.  
 
If debt counselling was as much a means of livelihood as a means of relieving financial 
stress, and if in rural areas the setting was already one of poor regulation and borderline 
illegality, it is perhaps not surprising that those formerly benefitting opportunistically from the 
indebted in one guise were reconfiguring themselves to do so in another. But even this shift 
of occupation has been slow. Confirming the claim of ‘patchy provision’ made by Frans 
Haupt and others, there is a commonly shared perception that this ‘law has not reached’ the 
rural areas. No-one has heard of any debt counsellors in my rural fieldsite in Mpumalanga. 
What are still much in evidence, instead, are makeshift posters advertising the services of 
those who – usually fraudulently – claim to be able to consolidate your debt or ‘expunge’ 
your records from the credit bureaux. 
 
Reflecting the general importance of the pay cheque, those most likely to get into debt, and 
certainly those most likely to seek counselling are those – both white and black – who are in 
receipt of regular salaries. Even those seeking debt counselling from sources other than the 
up-market offices and law firms described above – from the humbler offices like those of 
Thusong, for example, or from the few offices that offer free advice to those of slender 
means, like the Pretoria University Law Clinic – were generally members of the civil service, 
upwardly mobile, or middle class as broadly conceived. There is no indication, for example, 
that any of the miners at Marikana sought, or received, debt counselling. 
 
Hearing about the difficulties that cause clients to go into debt, counsellors find themselves 
going far beyond the technical skills of debt rescheduling to embrace the role normally 
associated with advice of a more therapeutic kind, as I hear from Thusong’s counsellors. 
‘Just when you think you’ve discussed everything – “here are all the creditors, this is my 
payslip”, etc.’, Sisinyana tells me, ‘you find that the real stories start to pour out: there’s a 
divorce pending, or the children are giving me a hard time, or this and that’. While 
counsellors are supportive in such cases, they can also become impatient where there is 
recalcitrance. 
 
Richard confirms that ‘the system has been so crafted that it gives everybody a chance’ and 
insists that debtors ought to act in good faith. Its even-handed fairness is built on the 
assumption that undertakings for repayments made by debtors – and the responses by 
creditors – are made ‘in good faith’. And indeed, there are occasions when the requisite spirit 
of collaboration is in evidence. In part because the law is thought to favour counsellors – and 
their clients the debtors – over creditors, the latter have been forced to take serious notice of 
what the counsellors say. Equally, however, there can be evidence – from both parties – of 
lack of ‘faith’. In the case of credit providers, Sisinyana complains, 
 
they come back with proposals. I mean, you’ve got ten creditors to satisfy, this one 
tells you ‘no, I’d rather not have R50, I’ll have R53’. But why must I change the whole 
agreement? Or they will say ‘go ahead and do a proposal based on this’. … So I go 
ahead and I do it. Then they say ‘you had no right to go and reduce my interest rate’ 
and I say ‘tough luck. This is according to the rules that you wrote.’ 
 
Considerable efforts were necessary to exact compliance from not only lenders, but also 
those who borrow from them – who often proved recalcitrant. ‘We forget’, says Richard, ‘that 
these people are the worst insofar as committing to anything’. Counsellors find themselves 
alternately threatening borrowers and morally blackmailing them in their efforts to get them 
to co-operate. ‘You have to tell them’, says Sisinyana, that 
 
‘the moment I reject you and the creditors know, you lose the house, you lose the 
car, they can do anything they want. They can sell everything, they can even sell 
your clothes. They’ve got the right to do that’. But you need to constantly remind 
them that these are the powers you have. …And you can just say to the client, ‘why 
do I have to phone you, beg from you? You are not acting in good faith. You don’t 
deserve to be on the programme.’ 
 
Even where clients do not prove to be unreachable, others make their rescheduled 
payments for only a short while, stopping after two or three weeks, and clients’ files are often 
closed on the basis of no co-operation. 
 
Although the Act involved consultations with both creditors and debtors, it is recalcitrance by 
the latter which debt counsellors find themselves addressing. This is, in part, because the far 
greater muscle of creditors makes it difficult to ‘reform’ them without recourse to robust legal 
proceedings, in which these creditors – usually large banks or retailers – have the edge 
because of being able to hire top lawyers. Reform of legislation, then, was turning instead 
into the attempted reform of persons, especially those who owed money. In their attempts to 
rectify debtor behaviour, debt counsellors used a rhetoric emphasizing ideas like ‘merit’ or 
the quality of being ‘deserving’, and pointing to the way a reformed debtor ‘ought’ to behave. 
Conversely, they celebrated cases where debtors comported themselves appropriately – in 
compliance with these injunctions. 
 
In one case, as I am told by Mareesa Erasmus of the Law Clinic, the debtor was ‘not taking 
responsibility’. She had ‘retail accounts, personal loans, bank accounts. And with every 
possible institution she has a credit card … sometimes more than one at the same place.’ In 
negotiations with the relevant credit providers, Mareesa had challenged them for their 
original profligacy in having extended credit to this woman: 
 
‘don’t tell me you guys are not guilty’. But they say ‘Oh, it was before the Act’. …I 
asked one guy ‘what happened in 2006? She has a number of new credit 
agreements starting just then’. …What happened in 2006 was, they would send 
invitations, send credit cards to clients. A lot of these … came to her, she was too 
weak to reject them. She said that if they thought she could afford it, maybe she 
could. 
 
In this and other similar cases of clients earning a relatively good income, ‘credit has been 
just dropped at her door’. Mareesa calculated her to be 85% overindebted. Initially, she was 
 
paying accounts with accounts. … So she would rotate the money. Take the ABSA 
Credit Card to pay Nedbank, take Nedbank Credit Card to pay the Standard Bank, 
and so on. She’d turn them around until she got to a point where she realized this 
was not going to work any more. 
 
But even after this client’s application for debt review, it was difficult to get anywhere with the 
case: the client was ‘not doing anything to reduce her expenditure’, was ‘still living a 
luxurious lifestyle – not abiding by the suggestions … made when we drew up the proposal’. 
Frustrated by the client’s non-compliance, Mareesa’s only option was to go to court to 
request a reduction in the interest rate on the client’s behalf, yet she knew that without a 
visible sign of commitment to reduce expenses this would not be granted. 
 
Keen to get some rulings made and some precedents established in this all-important piece 
of legislation, Mareesa knew that whatever case she did take to court would need to be 
selected with care. Rather than featuring a debtor wilfully living in an unsustainable manner, 
it would have to involve one for whom – for example – sudden and unexpected changes in 
circumstances had been the cause of overindebtedness, and who was now making 
strenuous efforts to reduce her owings and expenses. 
 
The client who seemed to fit the bill was a black woman who, having earned a decent salary, 
had lost her job after four years, had remained unemployed for 6 months, and had got a new 
job earning only half the salary. The principle problem was that she still owed money on her 
car. In marked contrast to the multiple card-holder, above, she had made efforts drastically 
to reduce her living expenses – but, having no other way of getting to work, was reluctant to 
give up the car. She had been paying a third of her monthly income in repayments to 
Wesbank, the vehicle finance company, leaving approximately another third to distribute to 
her other creditors. After she had approached Mareesa to help with debt rescheduling, the 
two of them had worked out a proposal for Wesbank – who rejected the offer, demanding 
that it be almost doubled 
 
I have a lot of problems with vehicle finance, in terms of making a suitable offer … 
but at the same time not being unfair towards the credit providers. Other credit 
providers are more reasonable. I discussed this with my client and she said ‘is that 
their final offer?’ I told her ‘I think we should take it to court, but there is a risk’. For 
her, the most important thing is keeping the car. So she instructed me to continue, 
she wanted to take their offer, pay the amount, keep the car, and see what she could 
do with the other credit providers. … 
 
‘Now’, Mareesa tells me, ‘she is trying to get extra income’ by doing extra lecturing work. 
‘Because she now realizes that the only way she is going to get out of this is to improve 
herself. .. And that is something in which we try to motivate the clients, as well. Sometimes, 
we say “you can do better” ’. 
 
Having been subject to the vagaries of fate, combined with a demonstrated willingness to 
‘tighten the belt’, made such a client appear more deserving, less recalcitrant, and enhanced 
the chances that she would have her argument accepted in court. In this case, Mareesa had 
calculated carefully that the chances of success were much better than they might have 
been in others – such as the multiple cardholder, above. 
 
In a case like this, where the client has done everything possible, and we’ve worked 
together, and really tried to …. It is not like she is living in luxury, she is living on the 
minimum. In a case like this, the court will recognize what is going on and make an 
order that is fair. 
 
Small successes, and ways forward 
 
While these cases might suggest that debt counselling was having little effect on the 
problems for which it was designed, its small achievements ought not to be denied. Given 
that many of these problems had arisen from inadequately policed legislative arrangements 
already in place, some of the minor victories won were those addressing the shortcomings of 
the old by applying the new. While practitioners bemoaned the fact that the existing 
apparatus was proving difficult to integrate with novel frameworks, and regretted that 
magistrates often knew so little about the act that they often asked the counsellors for advice 
on how to apply it, canny counsellors aiming to get around this problem made efforts to 
select only those magistrates who had made it their business to learn the new procedures. 
 
One initiative taken by protagonists of the new legislation to curb the worst excesses of the 
old was in the case where debt administrators simply ‘changed their hats’ to become debt 
counsellors. Existing frameworks were proving to have considerable staying power, allowing 
the exploiting of them to fraudulent ends. Personnel at the Law Clinic were acting on behalf 
of a debtor, to prevent a single creditor – the mortgage provider – from jumping ‘to the head 
of the queue’ by obtaining a garnishee order on the debtor’s salary. Had the creditor 
succeeded, this would have unfairly prevented the other creditors from getting their fair 
share. Indeed, it would have been unfair to the client himself, since it would have taken his 
home loan out of the reckoning and ultimately made his debt review implausible. The 
lawyers planned to oppose the summary judgment application which that creditor – the 
provider of their home loan – had made to the clerk of the magistrate’s court. 
 
In another case, Law Clinic personnel acted against a fraudulent administrator. They did so 
after having been approached by a client newly seeking relief through ‘debt 
review/counselling’, who had previously done so through ‘debt administration’. Not only this 
client, but two others, it turned out, had been put under debt administration via the same 
administrator. Despite being paid directly from the salaries of these clients into his 
trust/distribution account, the administrator had made none of the requisite payments to the 
clients’ credit providers. The Law Clinic acted, attempting to repossess the property of the 
administrator, only to find (in the case of his office furniture) that another creditor had already 
done so and (in the case of his household effects), that these did not belong to him and thus 
were not eligible to be removed. The administrator was reported to the police for fraud. He 
was being dealt with, in this case, using the means normally deployed against recalcitrant 
debtors. The game-keeper, in a reversal of the old proverb, had become the poacher: and 
the new regime was being used to survey and sanction him. 
 
In solution of the initial problems that had arisen from the fundamental clash between the 
interests of creditors and debtors, thus causing early difficulties to debt counsellors, I hear 
from Sisinyana – a year later, in 2009 – that ‘the various parties have got together and 
agreed on some rules,’ that both a mediating agency and a special tribunal have been set up 
to keep cases away from costly litigation and out of the clutches of undertrained magistrates, 
and that new forms of software have been developed to enable paperless operations. She 
complains, however, that so many new debt counsellors have been registered that her office 
is losing work. In a manner not unlike the old administrators, some of these turn out to be 
rogues. Two, she tells me, have been prosecuted for taking people’s money. ‘Different 
people do this job for different reasons, but the good ones … and the NCR in general will get 
a bad name because of these bad ones.’ 
 
Taking a step back from this level of detail, and looking at the broader picture, might it be 
said that the reforms had achieved their aims? When I interview consultant Marlene 
Heymans about this in 2009, she shows me data from the NCR which indicate that the 
amounts of credit being offered have drastically reduced. Mortgages and unsecured credit 
have both halved. Banks are reining in, either refusing credit where they previously offered it, 
or giving it at much higher rates of interest – around 15 or 20% per month for a short term 
loan. This is having the effect of reducing the extent of borrowing, and hence indebtedness – 
at least from those in the formal sector. 
 
We discuss the extent and effects of debt counselling. Figures gathered by the NCR indicate 
that, whereas previously only 3,000 were applying per month, three times as many were now 
doing so – although not all were accepted. The amount of indebtedness being accounted for 
by debt review and debt counselling had increased sharply. Whereas in June 2008 there had 
been a ‘structured redistribution’ of indebtedness of R11 million per month, in March of 2010 
the figure had climbed to R160 million per month. (At the same time, the number of credit 
impaired consumers had grown considerably.) 
 
Not all these changes, however, can be traced to the legislation. Given that the global 
recession hit at around the same time that the act became effective, ‘the whole picture is 
distorted by the loss of jobs,’ ‘This’, Heymans tells me, ‘is what is leading people to fall 
behind on their payments, and this leads to the increase of people going to debt 
counselling.’ Having even less demonstrable impact is that aspect of the Act relating to 
 
reckless lending …which states that you must check up on the financial means of 
your client, the prospects, etc, do a credit bureau check … For around half of credit 
providers, they have taken it to heart. But for the others, it’s a case of ‘what chance is 
there of being found out?’ 
 
Such attitudes are fostered by the fact that the courts have failed to rule definitively on the 
matter or to provide any case law. In one case where debt counsellors took creditors to 
court, they used a local and inexperienced lawyer, whereas the banks brought in ‘four senior 
counsel’. The court found against the debt counsellor, awarding the considerable costs to 
the banks. By 2010, there was only one case in which the court had found against a creditor 
– ABSA, one of the ‘big four banks’ – for having ‘recklessly’ extended a  home loan to a 
person who was soon to retire and would clearly have no means to repay it. 
 
The act’s lack of bite in regulating lenders has become generally accepted.  Rather than 
trying to police them, Sisinyana’s approach has now become one of reforming borrowers: 
 
The person must pay back, and must make an effort to do so. Don’t look at it as 
‘They had no right to extend the loan’ – this is beside the point. Instead, I try to 
encourage people to pay back. Make an effort – it has to be a painful process. 
Otherwise they won’t learn the lesson. You need to make sacrifices. Forget about 
movies, eating out 3 times a week. The only way is to pay in as much as I can. This 
way I get a lot of acceptance from creditors. I try to practise a system that makes 
sense. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The story of credit reform has been quintessentially South African. Attempts to liberalise the 
economy and provide opportunity, coupled with the promise of freedom (that included the 
right to consume), unleashed a feeding frenzy of credit provision. Both borrowers and 
lenders initially seemed to benefit from liberalisation, but things soon became unsustainable. 
Subsequent, belated, efforts were made by the state to curb the worst excesses. They 
embodied a spirit of democratic engagement by opening the doors to comment from widely 
divergent constituencies. But these seemed only to represent in starker form the 
irreconcilability of the interests of borrowers and lenders, of regulation and the market – with 
a tendency to veer towards the interests of the latter, in denial of the moral claim that 
‘lenders, like borrowers, should earn their trust’ (Shipton 2011:232). Mediating that stark 
opposition, however, there were the continual reminders that many not-so-well-off people 
were making an opportunistic living in the zone in between them.  Nevertheless, agents of 
change were determined to proceed. They were optimistic that, with perfectly designed 
planned intervention, the thin but steady trickle of credit essential to a liberal vision of 
wellbeing might be sustained without transforming into something that might impair financial 
wellness. In a setting where ‘neoliberal means interweave with and facilitate redistributive 
ends’ (Hull and James 2012:16), the thing most likely to sustain that ‘trickle’, however, 
proved to be the processes of redistribution, enabled by the receipt of salaries paid regularly 
into bank accounts. 
 
The sophistry of earlier arguments about the precise level at which limits to ‘the interest rate’ 
ought to be set, or whether such limits ought to be set at all, turned out to be misguided in 
the longer term. The people originally targeted for their recklessness – small informal 
borrowers and the small micro-lenders whose entrepreneurial energies had been unleashed 
by the initial liberalisation – were not those whose borrowing or lending ended up being 
curbed (if anyone’s was) by the Act. But perhaps these had been the wrong target in the first 
place. Those intended ought instead, perhaps, to have been wage- and salary-earners, 
those gradually climbing up the ladder of class mobility, whose greater earning power often 
meant that they were supporting poorer relatives. If they were the ones in greatest need of 
rescue, however, they were also sustaining the most intense demands on their salaries – 
and most likely to need to borrow. 
 
The questions that had ultimately remained unresolved despite thoughtful submissions by 
stakeholders to the Bill, were those that were now being left to debt counsellors to resolve. 
Counsellors in individual cases of debt review hoped to be able to have magistrates settle 
the interest rate ‘by law’. Reduced to reforming persons rather than the system, they hoped 
that once supplicants had shown themselves willing to tighten their belts, this might make for 
a less unbearable debt burden. Repentant debtors might at least stand a chance of repaying 
this, thus rehabilitating themselves. But magistrates, schooled in the old legislation and too 
little acquainted with the new, proved unwilling or unable to take such action. Even in higher 
courts, where action might have been possible against the ‘reckless’ excesses of credit 
capitalism which had failed to take heed of what the credit bureaux were telling it, the greater 
legal muscle of that capitalism was holding sway. Small successes by legal activists and 
‘cause lawyers’ exploited areas of uncertainty between the old and the new, but none of 
these had yet proved sufficiently robust to qualify as ‘reform’. A few refashioned citizens, a 
few small-time commission agents and debt collectors punished, seemed to be the most 
these efforts might yield. 
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